

15 APRIL 1947

I N D E X
of
WITNESSES

Defense' Witnesses

Page

MINAMI, Jiro (resumed)

19921

Cross by Mr. Comyns Carr (cont'd)

19921

MORNING RECESS

19940

Cross by Mr. Comyns Carr (cont'd)

19941

NOON RECESS

19956

Cross by Mr. Comyns Carr (cont'd)

19957

AFTERNOON RECESS

19980

Cross by Mr. Comyns Carr (cont'd)

19981

15 APRIL 1947

I N D E X
of
EXHIBITS

| <u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u> | <u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u> | <u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u> | <u>Description</u> | <u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u> | <u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u> |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2292 | 2436 | | Photostatic copy of a Letter written by MINAMI, Jiro, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, dated 6 October 1927 | . | 19943 |

1 Tuesday, 15 April 1947

2 - - -

3 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
4 FOR THE FAR EAST
5 Court House of the Tribunal
6 War Ministry Building
7 Tokyo, Japan

8 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9 at 0930.

10 - - -

11 Appearances:

12 For the Tribunal, same as before.

13 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

14 For the Defense Section, same as before.

15 - - -

16 (English to Japanese and Japanese
17 to English interpretation was made by the
18 Language Section, IMTFE.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except the accused TOGO, who is represented by his
5 counsel. The prison surgeon of Sugamo certifies
6 that the accused TOGO is too ill to attend the trial
7 today. This certificate will be recorded and filed.

8 Mr. Comyns Carr.

9 - - -

10 J I R O M I N A M I, one of the accused, resumed
11 the stand and testified through Japanese inter-
12 preters as follows:

13 CROSS-EXAMINATION

14 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

15 Q General MINAMI, before I proceed with the
16 question I was asking you last night: Do you agree
17 with what your co-accused ARAKI told us in exhibit
18 2216 that forces cannot be sent overseas without
19 the consent of the War, Navy, Finance, and Foreign
20 Ministers and the Premier?

21 A Yes, I do.

22 Q Now, on the 3rd of January, 1932, Chinchow
23 was occupied. Did you point out to your successor
24 that this was, as you say, contrary to the orders
25 that had been given when you were War Minister?

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19,921-1/2

1 A I was in Manchuria on an inspection and I
2 didn't tell ARAKI about this matter of the
3 occupation of Chinchow. I believe this occupation was
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1 necessitated by the state of the enemy, but this
2 was utterly contrary to my own policy.

3 Q Did you tell HONJO that it was contrary to
4 the orders you had given?

5 A At that time I was already -- I had already
6 left my post, so that I had no say in this matter.
7 However, when I was still War Minister, strict orders
8 for a retreat from that area were issued. These
9 orders were issued by the Chief of the General
10 Staff after I had communicated the government's
11 desire in this respect to the Chief of the General
12 Staff.

13 Q But you were in Manchuria, you say, within
14 three weeks after you had left and found
15 these orders being disobeyed?

16 A Yes, that is so.

17 Q Who sent you on this tour of inspection?

18 A I went to Manchuria on orders from War
19 Minister ARAKI.

20 Q And didn't you ask General HONJO why he
21 was disobeying orders you had given or whether he
22 had got fresh ones from ARAKI?

23 A No, I did not.

24 Q Why not?

25

MINAMI

CROSS

1 A I believed that it was not proper for me
2 as a member of the former government to touch upon
3 matters such as these when the government had al-
4 ready changed and the policies also had changed.

5 Q Did you know whether the new government
6 had given orders for this to be done?

7 A I do not know what orders were issued. I
8 simply know of the fact that Chin Chow was occupied.

9 Q When you got home did you make a report
10 to General ARAKI?

11 A Yes, I did.

12 Q Did you report to him that Chin Chow had
13 been occupied contrary to the orders which you had
14 given?

15 A I did tell him that the occupation of
16 Chin Chow was contrary to the policies which I had
17 set up during my tenure of office.

18 Q What did he say to that?

19 A All he did was to listen.

20 Q Well, now, I asked you whether in addition
21 to listening to lectures as a Supreme War Councillor
22 you had given any, and you said "No." I now want
23 to read to you exhibit 2251, which is an extract from
24
25

MINAMI

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1 Marquis KIDO's diary of the 28th of January, 1932.
2 It is prosecution document 1632-"-3.

3 "January 28th, 1932.

4 "At 2:00 p. m. today, General MINAMI de-
5 livered a lecture on the latest situation in Manchuria
6 before the Emperor in the Palace. I had the honor
7 to attend the lecture in the Imperial presence."
8 'I' is Marquis KIDO.

9 "General MINAMI told us of his impressions
10 resulting from his inspection of the general situa-
11 tion there. He explained that the brave action of
12 our Japanese troops lay in the Japanese people's
13 overall assistance to them, their firm belief in
14 victory, and their confidence in their own military
15 skill.

16 "His conclusions regarding the Manchuria-
17 Mongolia question:

18 "I. In the matter of our national defence,
19 Japan's relation to the new state and its adminis-
20 tration will be to take over its defence and by ex-
21 pediting the completion of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway,
22 make the Sea of Japan into a lake and facilitate
23 Japan's advance into the North Manchuria area.
24 Thus our national defence would be renewed.
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"II. Japan-Manchuria Joint Management -

To take concrete measures against economic block-
ade from abroad, thereby firmly establishing a method
by which Japan can live forever as a power in the
world.

"III. Solution of the Population Problem -

It is not so difficult to solve the population prob-
lem provided that we give our emigrants in Manchuria
the same protection as that which they receive in
South America, and provided that we establish a col-
onial trooping system there."

MINAMI

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1 THE MONITOR: Is that all, Mr. Carr?

2 MR. COMYNS CARR: It has been read, yes

3 Q Now did you deliver that lecture as Marquis
4 KIDO records?

5 THE MONITOR: Just a moment, Mr. Carr. We
6 will have to read the Japanese version first.

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes, that is what I
8 thought.

9 THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal expects simul-
10 taneous readings in such matters.

11 THE MONITOR: I am sorry, Mr. President.
12 We didn't know that the whole of the document was
13 going to be read.

14 Q Now did you deliver that lecture?

15 A That lecture is truth as I said.

16 Q Then why did you tell me yesterday that you
17 did not deliver any lectures?

18 MR. BROOKS: If your Honor please, if the
19 Tribunal please, the record will show the counsellor
20 asked if he delivered any lectures as War Councillor.
21 I think the document speaks for itself. This was
22 not a lecture before the War Council.

23 THE PRESIDENT: You have a right to re-examine,
24 Captain Brooks. That should be sufficient.
25

1 Q General MINAMI, is that your explanation or
2 only your counsel's?

3 A That would be my own explanation.

4 Q Then we are to understand, are we, that when
5 I asked you about lectures yesterday you knew
6 perfectly well that you delivered this one, but
7 you said "no" because it was not delivered in the
8 capacity of a Supreme War Councillor?

9 MR. BROOKS: I object to that question,
10 your Honor, as being argumentative. If the counsel
11 wants to ask for a general answer, he should ask
12 it in the type of question that calls for a general
13 answer. His own question is what caused the answer.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We think these interruptions
15 are uncalled for.

16 THE INTERPRETER: The witness answered "yes"
17 to the previous question.

18 MR. COMYNS CARR: I think he wants to add
19 something.

20 Q Do you, General MINAMI?

21 A Yes. I would like to add a few words.
22 These tea parties were a kind of discussion group
23 and were not official affairs. Therefore, various --
24 the people that came to these parties would exchange
25 their opinions on various subjects. I believe that

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1 what was written in Marquis KIDO's diary is true.
2 However, it needs an explanation no doubt; that is,
3 I was -- I attended this discussion group not as
4 a Supreme War Councillor but as a private individual,
5 and I do not think that you can call it a formal
6 lecture. I would like to add a short explanation
7 on the topics mentioned in that talk.

8 Q I think you had better wait until I ask
9 you some questions about them for that. But about
10 the lecture --

11 MR. BROOKS: May the witness be allowed
12 to explain the matter raised by the counsel, please?

13 THE PRESIDENT: He did not claim any right
14 to explain anything, if I heard him correctly. He
15 wanted to add something which may not have been
16 by way of explanation. We are wholly unimpressed
17 by this attitude of Captain Brooks.

18 MR. BROOKS: If your Honor please, I am
19 not trying to impress the Court or impress anyone
20 but to get this man a fair trial and let him be
21 fully heard when something is raised against him;
22 and he did ask to be heard.

23 THE PRESIDENT: You are obstructing the
24 trial. You are preventing a fair trial by your
25 attitude. We are not going to allow this Court to

MINAMI

CROSS

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MINAMI

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1 be used for propaganda purposes.

2 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I think
3 as defense counsel I have a right to an explanation
4 from the Bench for such a remark cast on American
5 counsel. I am sure I have not tried to do anything
6 that was not proper in this Court and I have not
7 tried to use propaganda in any way; and as I under-
8 stand, the Court is reflecting that I am trying
9 to say something for propaganda purposes and it
10 is not true. I sincerely wish to be heard on any
11 expression that you may have in your mind. If you
12 have anything that I have said that you think is
13 propaganda, I would like for you to express it so
14 that I can avoid it if it is necessary.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Propaganda means propaganda.
16 Nothing I said is in doubt. American counsel as such
17 have no terrors for us nor have any other nation's
18 counsel. We are here to conduct a fair trial, and we
19 are not going to be browbeaten by American Counsel or
20 any other counsel.

21 MR. BROOKS: I am sorry if I have been
22 browbeating the Court. I did not realize it, if
23 that is true, your Honor.
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THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr.

BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

Q General MINAMI, Marquis KIDO describes this as a lecture in the Imperial presence. Do you seriously say that it was only an informal discussion at a tea party?

A Yes, I do.

THE PRESIDENT: Did your position as Supreme War Councillor explain your presence before the Emperor to deliver a lecture on that subject?

THE WITNESS: May I explain? This is the way the matter stood: If I had given a formal lecture the Emperor would not have attended such a gathering. When the Emperor holds a tea party and we are given tea and cakes that is not a formal affair.

Correction on the previous statement: If I had delivered a formal lecture before the Emperor there ought not to have been any other attendants. Therefore, this talk was not given in my official capacity as Supreme War Councillor at all. At this party an informal exchange of opinions was held.

Q General MINAMI, do you remember being interrogated about this lecture on the 18th of March 1946?

A Yes, I do.

1 Q Let me read you the question and answer.

2 "In January 1932 you delivered an address
3 in which you advocated further advance in Manchuria."

4 A I have been repeating and repeating since --
5 for the past few minutes that I did not deliver
6 any lecture.

7 Q The words used on this occasion were "An
8 address" and it was not then suggested to you that
9 you delivered it in any particular capacity or to
10 any particular person. The question went on "You
11 advocated early completion of the Kirin-Kwainai
12 Railway and advocated making the Japanese sea a
13 Japanese lake and facilitating the advance in North
14 Manchuria, did you not?"

15 A There is a premise to that which is if
16 Manchuria at the time I inspected it could have
17 been granted independence.

18 Q General MINAMI, I am asking you at the
19 moment whether you remember being asked that question
20 when you were interrogated?

21 A I do not remember.

22 Q Did you reply, "I do not recall such an
23 address or making such statements."?

24 A Yes; as you say.

25 Q Well now, I want to ask you some questions

1 about Marquis KIDO's report. According to him you
2 said Japan's relation to the new state and its
3 administration will be to take over its defense.

4 On the 28th of January 1932 was there any
5 new state?

6 A No. This discussion meeting was held
7 immediately upon my return to Japan from my in-
8 spection of Manchuria, and, after I had actually seen
9 conditions in Manchuria, I found that Manchuria
10 was far more advanced than I had supposed when I
11 was in Tokyo. Therefore, of course, I did not
12 know how things were developed in Manchuria; but,
13 if Manchuria did become an independent state at
14 that time, that is the premise that must be made.

15 Q You know that it wasn't until the 18th
16 of February that the first declaration of independence
17 in the name of Manchuria was issued; don't you?

18 A Yes.

19 Q And you told us yesterday that it was your
20 policy to prevent the Japanese army having anything
21 to do with forming any new state.

22 A Yes, I did.

23 Q How do you reconcile that with what you
24 are telling the Emperor?

25 A On my inspection tour off Manchuria I met

MINAMI

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1 and talked with various people and there learned
2 that influential leaders in various parts of Man-
3 churia such as Kirin, Harbin and Taonan were in favor
4 of establishing the independence of Manchuria.
5 When I went, of course, I did not know how things
6 would develop in Manchuria so I had no idea that
7 Manchuria would become an independent state. When
8 I met HONJO I told him once again, as I had already
9 done in orders sent previously, that the army
10 must not be involved in the independence movement
11 at all. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in
12 what I said.
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1 Q Who introduced you to these influential
2 leaders that you are telling us about?

3 A Some came to see me; some I heard about.

4 Q From whom?

5 A Such leaders as Hsi Hsia, Sun Chi-chan,
6 Tsang Shih-i and Hsieh Chieh-shih either came to see
7 me or I interviewed them.

8 Q I asked you from whom you heard about the
9 others.

10 A From various people.

11 Q People occupying what sort of positions?

12 A I am afraid I don't remember. I think the
13 best thing to say would be from various people.

14 Q Isn't the truth that so far as you heard about
15 them at all it was from officers of the Kwantung Army?

16 A No, not only from them. The officers of the
17 Kwantung Army from whom I heard this were such people
18 as Commander in Chief HONJO, influential members of
19 his staff and commanders of the independent garrison
20 forces and their number was very limited. I believe
21 I also met Consul-General HAYASHI.

22 Q Did Consul-General HAYASHI tell you that there
23 was a genuine independence movement in Manchuria?

24 A: He said that various quarters were talking
25 about such things. He said that he had heard of such

MINAMI

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1 things from various quarters.

2 Q Did he say that he had heard that the Kwantung
3 Army was trying to foment such a thing?

4 A No, he did not.

5 Q Now, then, I think that is enough of that.
6 What do you mean by making the Sea of Japan into a
7 lake?

8 A This is my own opinion and I touched on it
9 slightly last Friday. I have always been an advocate
10 of peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. This is
11 a conviction that I have had from long ago. It was
12 my hope that the Japan Sea, that the waters of the
13 Japan Sea would always be as calm as those of a lake.
14 That was the most important thing and for that I believed
15 in maintaining peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.
16 This would be important -- this sea would be important
17 not only in joining Japan and Korea but also in main-
18 taining trade with Manchuria as well as in maintaining
19 peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. My pro-
20 Soviet policy was opposed to quite an extent not only
21 by the army but also by the people at large -- by
22 statesmen at large.

23 Q Isn't there a very much simpler answer to
24 my question than that? Didn't you mean that in the
25 future, owing to the occupation of Manchuria, Japan

1 would control both sides of the Sea of Japan?

2 A That is not so. Such funny opinions are
3 entirely opposed to my fundamental ideas.

4 Q In which direction does this Kirin-Kwainei
5 Railway run? Towards the Russian frontier or away
6 from it?

7 THE PRESIDENT: The answer is both ways.

8 A The Kirin-Kwainei Railway is the railway
9 that goes from Kirin in Manchuria to Kwainei in Korea.

10 Q Yes, and passes close to the Russian frontier,
11 doesn't it?

12 A No, far more to the south.

13 Q What did you mean by facilitating Japan's
14 advance in the North Manchuria area?

15 A What I meant was that by the opening of the
16 Kirin-Kwainei Railway the transportation of goods to
17 and from Manchuria would be -- to and from North
18 Manchuria would be greatly facilitated just as the
19 South Manchuria Railway aids in transporting goods
20 to and from South Manchuria.

21 Q What sort of goods?

22 A Products grown in those areas. At that time
23 one of the greatest products was grain and especially
24 soy beans.
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1 Q Have you forgotten that you went on to say,
2 "Thus our national defense plans would be revolution-
3 ized."?

4 A What I meant there was that, by the estab-
5 lishment of the Kirin-Kainei Railroad, the stability
6 of Manchuria would be ensured.

7 THE MONITOR: Thus contributing to the
8 national defense of Japan.

9 Q Against whom were you particularly thinking
10 of national defense in this matter?

11 A Against an enemy.

12 Q Which enemy?

13 A Any enemy which would try to attack Japan or
14 Manchuria.

15 Q Which one did you think was likely?

16 A By "defense" I meant defense against any pos-
17 sible enemies and the establishment of defense in the
18 event of an invasion. Needless to say, such a pos-
19 sible enemy would be the Soviet Union.

20 Q Yes.

21 A That is why I consistently maintained that
22 peaceful relations should be established with the
23 Soviet Union.

24 Q Now, on Friday I asked you this question, and
25 I want to know whether you still give me the same

1 answer that you gave me then. The question was:
2 "Was not the idea of the Japanese Army that they
3 would be in a much stronger position in the event
4 of war with Russia if they were previously in occu-
5 pation of Manchuria?" You said, "No." Do you still
6 say "no"?

7 A The basis of my idea was the stabilization
8 of Manchuria. Therefore, again I must reply to your
9 question, no.

10 Q Now, in the next paragraph of his report of
11 your lecture, Marquis KIDO gives the heading "Japan-
12 Manchuria Joint Management." Can you tell me why,
13 if this state which didn't yet exist was to be an
14 entirely independent one with which the Kwantung Army
15 was to have nothing to do, it was to take over --
16 Japan was to take over the new state's defense and
17 to have joint management of the country?

18 A I believe I replied to that question al-
19 ready, which is that I did not know at the time of
20 my inspection of Manchuria how things would actually
21 turn out. All I could see was that Manchuria might
22 become independent. Everything was on the basis of
23 presumptions.

24 Q Wasn't it on the basis of advance informa-
25 tion of what was going to happen on the 18th of

February?

1 A No.

2 Q Now, in your third paragraph, Marquis KIDO
3 reports you as saying, in connection with the popu-
4 lation problem, that it wouldn't be so difficult if,
5 amongst other things, you established a colonial
6 trooping system there. What do you mean by that?

7 A If Manchuria did become independent, to
8 begin with, it was a country with a very wide area
9 and a rather small population. There was much room
10 for immigration. If immigration did take place, I
11 believed it would be wise to adopt the Chinese sys-
12 tem of each hamlet maintaining its own soldiers
13 against bandits, and so forth. And, therefore, I
14 believed that a system such as that you mentioned
15 might be considered.

16 Q Didn't you mean --

17 THE MONITOR: Just a moment, please, Mr.
18 Carr. "System such as colonial soldier system would
19 be feasible there. That's the way I thought."

20 Q Didn't you mean that the colonists were to
21 be reservists of the Japanese Army?

22 A No, that is not what I meant.

23 Q They were, weren't they?

24 A No, they were not.
25

1 Q Now, you have several times, both on Friday
2 and today, told us that you had always been opposed
3 to war with Russia. Were you Vice Chief of the
4 General Staff from March, 1927 to August, 1929?

5 THE MONITOR: Was it March 1st or just
6 March, '27?

7 MR. COMYNS CAIR: March only.

8 A Yes, I was.

9 Q Did the General Staff control the military
10 attaches of the various embassies?

11 A Yes. Concerning personnel affairs, the Vice
12 Chief of the General Staff had powers.

13 Q Was it your practice to instruct the mili-
14 tary attaches to indulge in espionage and subversive
15 work?

16 A I have never indulged in such silly prac-
17 tices.

18 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
19 minutes.

20 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
21 taken until 1100, after which the proceed-
22 ings were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

4 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing):

5 Q Do you remember a man named KOMATSUBARA,
6 Michitaro?

7 A Yes, I do.

8 Q Was he a military attache to the Japanese
9 Embassy in the Soviet Union in 1927?

10 A I do not know.

11 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I wanted
12 to call to the Court's attention that the prosecution's
13 questions are now going beyond the Indictment, into
14 1927. I do not think it is proper with the accused
15 on the stand.

16 THE PRESIDENT: At times we have gone back
17 beyond 1895; in fact, as far back as 1848 at one stage.

18 MR. BROOKS: The point I was making was that
19 this was not a question on background material as such,
20 but the accused has not been charged for his actions
21 prior to 1928. And it isn't a proper question I think
22 under the Indictment.

23 THE PRESIDENT: He did state that he was
24 always opposed to war with the Soviet Union. And as
25 a Member of the Court puts it, relevancy is not

1 determined by dates.

2 The objection is overruled.

3 Q Would you look at prosecution document 2992,
4 please?

5 (Whereupon, a document was handed
6 to the witness.)

7 Q Is that a photostatic copy of a letter written
8 by you on the 6th of October 1927?

9 A I saw it.

10 Q Does it bear your seal?

11 A Yes.

12 MR. COMYNS CARR: I ask that the document
13 be admitted in evidence, your Honor.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

15 MR. BROOKS: May the defense be furnished
16 copies of it, sir?

17 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes.

18 MR. BROOKS: We have not had copies served on
19 us.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We order that copies be served
21 on the defense.

22 MR. BROOKS: It may be I would like to object
23 at a later time.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
25 No. 2992 will receive exhibit No. 2436.

1 (Whereupon, the document above re-
2 ferred to was marked prosecution exhibit
3 No. 2436, and received in evidence.)

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: "Top Secret Army General Staff--

5 THE PRESIDENT: Apparently the Japanese ver-
6 sion is being read.

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes. I didn't realize that,
8 your Honor. I will now read the English. I presume
9 the Japanese needn't be read again.

10 (Continuing) "Confidential #2081. Instruc-
11 tion on investigation of special organizations, asso-
12 ciations and important individuals who may be used
13 for the gathering of intelligence information, for
14 propaganda and subversive activities. October 6, 1927.

15 "MINAMI, Jiro, Deputy Chief of the Army General
16 Staff (seal).

17 "To: KAMATSUBARA, Michitaro, Military
18 Attache at the Japanese Embassy in the USSR.

19 "I request to gather the most detailed informa-
20 tion on special organizations, associations, important
21 individuals, etc., who may be used for collecting
22 intelligence information, for propaganda, and subversive
23 activities in concert with various military operations
24 in each informant's areas, and keep sending this infor-
25 mation as soon as it is received, according to the

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following points:"

1 I won't read the rest of it.

2 Q Now, General MINAMI, why did you tell me that
3 you didn't use the Japanese military attaches for
4 anything so silly as espionage and subversive activities?
5

6 A Military attaches are under the direct control
7 of the Chief of the General Staff, and a Vice-Chief of
8 Staff attends to business matters. And the purpose of
9 military attaches is to conduct intelligence activities.

10 I had completely forgotten about this letter until you
11 showed it to me just now. But on looking at it I find
12 that my seal is affixed to it. Therefore, I presume
13 that such a letter must have been issued, and I think
14 that many more such letters must have been issued.

15 Q But is that an answer to the question why you
16 told me just before the recess that you didn't do any-
17 thing so silly as to use these attaches for espionage
18 and subversive activities?

19 A It is, because this was in 1927 and I, as Vice-
20 Chief of the General Staff, merely transmitted orders
21 from the Chief of the General Staff as a routine matter.

22 It goes without saying that each time the Chief
23 of the General Staff is changed, operational plans and
24 other policies also change. At that time that was the
25 policy.

1 Q Isn't the truth that you knew very well
2 that you did use them for those purposes; you didn't
3 know I had got your letter to prove it?

4 A Maybe so. But I believe that it is recognized
5 in every country that the principal duty of military
6 attaches is to conduct intelligence activities, and as
7 Vice Chief of the General Staff I was merely trans-
8 mitting a routine matter as a matter of course.

9 Q Do you believe that it is their principal
10 duty also to conduct subversive activities?

11 A They may study how to carry out such plans,
12 but I never admit for a moment that such plans would
13 actually be carried out.

14 Q During the time you were Vice Chief of the
15 General Staff, was there a man named KANDA, Masatane,
16 serving under you?

17 A I do not remember.

18 Q Do you remember prosecution exhibit 698,
19 which is a detailed series of instructions by him to
20 a Major KASAHARA--

21 A No, I do not.

22 Q Being an outline of sabotage activities against
23 Soviet Russia?

24 A I do not know of such a document. There is
25 no reason why the Vice Chief of the General Staff

MINAMI

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1 should know of such petty affairs and instructions
2 which were being sent to and from inferior members
3 of the General Staff. Furthermore, since I have never
4 sent such orders myself, naturally I have no recollection
5 of them.

6 Q Was it part of the policy of the General Staff
7 at that time that military officers should be posted
8 in disguise at the consulates in Soviet Russia?

9 MR. BROOKS: I wish to object, your Honor,
10 to the question. I think we are going farther and
11 farther afield from the scope of the Indictment. I
12 do not know how far back the prosecutor intends to go,
13 but we are back in the period of 1927 and activities
14 there. There are no charges there. I can't see how
15 it could have any bearing in this case. I think that
16 if we go back beyond 1927 we are going to get back into
17 a history when there was really no government in China.
18 One of the nations on the bench was not even represented
19 at that time. The representative on the bench from
20 China at that time was a revolutionist -- I mean the
21 head of the government was revolutionist in that
22 period. We are getting so far afield, that is why I
23 made my first objection.

24
25 The matter of limiting the scope of this
examination I think was seriously considered by the

MINAMI

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1 ones who framed the Indictment from the period 1928
2 down to the latter period. If we go beyond that period,
3 it is beyond the period of many of the treaties upon
4 which this case is based, and it is a period in which
5 there was much struggle going on in China and in those
6 areas. It would take a great deal of explanation on
7 the part of the defense to go into and meet any charges
8 covered in that period.

9 I speak this way, Your Honor, not disrespectful
10 to the Court, but in order to try to save time and to
11 narrow the issues down to the scope of the Indictment.

12 THE PRESIDENT: The cross-examination is
13 within the scope of the rule laid down by the Court.

14 The objection is overruled.
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1 Q During the period when you were Vice Chief
2 of the General Staff from 1927 to 1929 was it the
3 policy of the General Staff that military officers
4 disguised as officials of the Consulates should be
5 stationed at the Consulates in Soviet Russia?

6 A No.

7 Q Was it a part of their policy that bandits
8 in Manchuria should be enlisted to fight on the
9 Japanese side against Soviet Russia?

10 A No.

11 Q Now we will come to the time when you became
12 Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army in December
13 1934 to March 1936. Had you under your command there
14 local forces recruited in Manchuria as well as Japan-
15 ese troops?

16 A No.

17 Q Were there such forces not under your command?

18 A No.

19 Q Do you mean to say that there were no non-
20 Japanese forces in the area of what you call Manchukuo?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Under whose command were they?

23 THE INTERPRETER: The witness meant to say
24 that there were no such forces. There were no non-
25 Japanese forces in Manchuria.

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12 Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army in December
13 1934 to March 1936. Had you under your command there
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17 Q Were there such forces not under your command?

18 A No.

19 Q Do you mean to say that there were no non-
20 Japanese forces in the area of what you call Manchukuo?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Under whose command were they?

23 THE INTERPRETER: The witness meant to say
24 that there were no such forces. There were no non-
25 Japanese forces in Manchuria.

1 A There were none under my command.

2 Q Were there any there at all?

3 THE MONITOR: At the same time the witness
4 just said, "Will you wait a moment?"

5 A I do not know. I commanded no forces other
6 than Japanese troops as Commander of the Kwantung
7 Army under the direct control of the Emperor. The
8 Japanese commander had no troops of foreign countries
9 under his command nor did he have anything to do with
10 bandits.

11 Q Now would you mind answering the question?
12 Were there not local forces in Manchuria who were not
13 Japanese as well as the Japanese forces?

14 A There may have been but I do not recall. I
15 was only commander of Japanese troops and any troops
16 other than Japanese troops never entered my head at all.

17 Q The witness Goette has told us that he saw
18 non-Japanese troops marching out of the Manchukuo
19 area and invading the demilitarized zone. Do you say
20 there weren't any?

21 A I only wanted to say that there were no non-
22 Japanese troops under my command.

23 Q Yes, but you know I asked whether there were
24 some that weren't under your command?

25 A I do not know.

1 Q And I suggest to you that whether they were
2 nominally under your command or not they worked with
3 you and did what you told them?

4 A I have never resorted to such undercover
5 activities. I was simply commander of the Japanese
6 troops and that is all I know about.

7 Q Were these other forces bandits?

8 A I have repeatedly answered that they were
9 not under my command; therefore I know nothing about
10 them.

11 Q But if they were there in the same country
12 as your troops do you mean us to believe that you
13 didn't know who they were?

14 A If, in fact, I did not know of them I cannot
15 reply anything except that I did not know.

16 Q The question I am putting to you is whether
17 you really want us to believe that you didn't know?

18 THE PRESIDENT: You need not answer that.

19 Q Well, now, during the time you were in command
20 there were there railways being constructed in Manchuria?

21 A Railway construction was going on in some
22 parts of the country. I do not remember exactly but
23 I know that railroad construction was going on.

24 Q And did the railways that were being con-
25 structed lead to the Soviet border?

1 A Yes.

2 Q And were they being constructed for strategic
3 purposes?

4 A Occasion for their use for such purposes
5 might conceivably have arisen; however, their principal
6 objective was the opening up of Northern Manchuria.

7 Q Was the Kwantung Army building airfields in
8 Manchuria while you were there?

9 A I believe they constructed many air bases.

10 Q Against whom?

11 A We built these air bases taking into consider-
12 ation the possibility of a Soviet attack -- Airfields
13 were constructed with such a possibility in view.

14 Q Was there number increased from five to forty-
15 three?

16 A I do not remember the exact number but I
17 know that while I was there five or six bases were
18 either completed or were nearing completion. I was in
19 my post for a total of one year and three months. I
20 believe during this period two or three were completed.

21 Q During the same period were seven fortified
22 districts built?

23 A I do not get the meaning of fortified districts.

24 Q Were not seven areas in Manchuria fortified
25 during that period?

1 A Yes.

2 Q And were they being constructed for strategic
3 purposes?

4 A Occasion for their use for such purposes
5 might conceivably have arisen; however, their principal
6 objective was the opening up of Northern Manchuria.

7 Q Was the Kwantung Army building airfields in
8 Manchuria while you were there?

9 A I believe they constructed many air bases.

10 Q Against whom?

11 A We built these air bases taking into consider-
12 ation the possibility of a Soviet attack -- Airfields
13 were constructed with such a possibility in view.

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15 three?

16 A I do not remember the exact number but I
17 know that while I was there five or six bases were
18 either completed or were nearing completion. I was in
19 my post for a total of one year and three months. I
20 believe during this period two or three were completed.

21 Q During the same period were seven fortified
22 districts built?

23 A I do not get the meaning of fortified districts.

24 Q Were not seven areas in Manchuria fortified
25 during that period?

MINAMI

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1 A I do not remember exactly. I know that in
2 North Manchuria construction work for defense purposes
3 was carried on; however, I do not know if three such
4 positions were built or five or seven.

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1 Q And was this in execution of -- I do not
2 mean the fortified districts alone, but all that I
3 have been putting, all that I have been asking you
4 about -- in execution of a plan the general lines of
5 which were laid down in March, 1931?

6 A In March, 1931, I was a member of the
7 Supreme War Council and was in Tokyo. I had no
8 connection with any such plan and, therefore, do not
9 know whether such a plan existed or not.

10 Q Do you remember a man named TAKEBE, Rokuzo?

11 A Yes, I do remember him.

12 Q Was he the Chief or Deputy Chief of the
13 General Affairs Department of the Manchurian Govern-
14 ment while you were in command of the Kwantung Army?

15 A I believe he was either the Chief or the
16 Deputy Chief.

17 Q And did you inform him during that period
18 that the most important aim of the Japanese occupa-
19 tion of Manchuria was to build up a military base on
20 the continent?

21 A No.

22 Q And that the base was directed chiefly against
23 the USSR and China?

24 A No. I would like to add a word of explana-
25 tion. My job in Manchuria was to assist the

1 establishment of a healthy, strong, independent
2 state, and it is impossible even to conceive that I
3 should have had such a view as you said in mind.
4 Therefore, there is no reason why I should state such
5 views to an official of the Manchurian Government.

6 Q He was a Japanese, wasn't he?

7 A Yes, but he was an official of the Man-
8 churian Government.

9 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, those questions
10 are based on exhibit 670.

11 Q Were not all of or most of the controlling
12 posts in the Manchurian Government held by Japanese
13 officials?

14 A That is a great mistake.

15 Q When you first arrived in Manchuria did you
16 find the Manchurian Government engaged in setting up
17 an oil monopoly in the country?

18 A I do not know.

19 Q Wasn't it, as I understood you to say just
20 now, part of your job to establish a strong and
21 healthy government in Manchuria?

22 A I know nothing about oil. I do not even
23 remember about it.

24 Q Isn't that one of the matters in which you
25 would control the Manchurian Government if it was

1 going on?

2 A If there was an oil monopoly that was being
3 run by the Manchurian Government, I am convinced that
4 the Kwantung Army had nothing to do with such affairs.
5 You said just now -- in your question just now you
6 spoke of controlling Manchuria, but I believe that
7 is a great mistake.

8 THE MONITOR: You spoke of myself being in
9 control of the Manchurian Government.

10 A (Continuing) Manchuria and Japan were on
11 an equal footing. To assist in the development of
12 a strong, healthy state simply meant to help it
13 become such a state and to hope that it would become
14 such a state, and it is very far from meaning to
15 control it.

16 Q You were also Ambassador to Manchukuo,
17 weren't you?

18 A Yes.

19 Q And didn't you know what they were doing?

20 A On the whole I believe I did know what they
21 were doing, but I do not have any clear recollection
22 on that point. There were many influential people
23 in the Embassy and especially trained career diplo-
24 mats from the Foreign Office; so on the whole I left
25 matters in charge of them.

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1 Q Were you as Ambassador in direct communica-
2 tion with the Foreign Office in Tokyo?

3 A Yes.

4 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
5 half-past one.

6 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess
7 was taken.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

4 - - -

5 J I R O M I N A M I, one of the accused, resumed
6 the stand and testified through Japanese Inter-
7 preters as follows:

8 CROSS-EXAMINATION

9 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

10 Q General MINAMI, were you informed that the
11 United States Government had several times protes-
12 ted to the Japanese Foreign Office about this oil
13 monopoly in Manchuria?

14 A No, I do not. I would like to add one more
15 word to the prosecutor: There was a slight mistake
16 in the -- in one of the statements I made in the
17 morning, so I would like to have the opportunity
18 of correcting it.

19 Q Certainly.

20 A The position of Chief of the General Affairs
21 Bureau of Manchuria was held by TAKEBE, Rokuzo dur-
22 ing the incumbency of General UMEZU as commander
23 of the Kwantung Army. I would like to make a correc-
24 tion on this point. That is all.

25 Q Wasn't he also in the General Affairs

MINAMI

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1 Bureau during your time?

2 A Yes, he was in it. He was in the Kwantung
3 Affairs Bureau.

4 Q Now, then, did you say when you were in-
5 terrogated, exhibit 2207, page 3, prosecution docu-
6 ment 1869, the last three questions --

7 A What is the question?

8 Q "What did you have to do with the Govern-
9 ment of Manchukuo at that time?"

10 MR. COMYNS CARR: Haven't you found it,
11 Language Division, document 1869, the last three
12 questions?

13 THE MONITOR: Just a moment, please. Evi-
14 dently we do not have it, Mr. Comyns Carr. If it
15 is not too long I think we can handle it.

16 Q "What did you have to do with the Govern-
17 ment of Manchukuo at that time?"

18 "A Essentially I advised them on such
19 matters as agriculture, transportation, education,
20 et cetera."

21 A Yes, that is so.

22 Q The next question was: "And your advice
23 was accepted, I suppose?"

24 "A Yes."

25 A Yes, that is so.

1 Q And the last question was: "In fact, your
2 advice, in substance, was a direction, was it not?

3 "A You might say so, yes."

4 A Yes. On that point a few words of explana-
5 tion -- On the third point a few words of explana-
6 tion are necessary. At that time the prosecutor's
7 words were translated to me as "That would happen
8 if the Manchurian Government did not follow your
9 advice? In the final analysis would it not be equiva-
10 lent to a direction?" to which I replied: "If it
11 be taken in that way, I suppose it can't be helped."

12 Therefore, during my tenure of office I
13 never once gave any kind of order to the Manchurian
14 Government.

15 Q Was that because you knew they would have
16 to accept your advice or you would give an order?

17 A I didn't know in what state of mind the
18 Manchurian officials were, but as far as I myself
19 was concerned, ever since my arrival in Manchuria
20 I had the firm conviction that Manchuria and Japan
21 were on an equal footing, and I never acted from
22 the basis of a superiority complex.

23 Q Can you remember an occasion when they
24 did not accept your advice?

25 A I do not.

MINAMI

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1 Q Now, during your tenure of office, namely,
2 in July of 1935, was there a new Manchurian-Japanese
3 economic agreement put into effect?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Did you negotiate it?

6 A Yes.

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: Reference for this is
8 exhibit 850, but it is not one of those I have
9 given notice of.

10 Q Was there to be a joint committee consist-
11 ing of four members from each country?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Were the Japanese representatives to be
14 the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and three
15 others?

16 A Yes.

17 Q And was one of the four representatives
18 of Manchukuo to be the Chief of General Affairs?

19 A I believe that was so.

20 Q And was he always a Japanese?

21 A Yes.

22 Q So that in effect, the Japanese had a per-
23 manent majority on the committee, hadn't they?

24 A Yes. I don't remember this agreement very
25 clearly. If it is in your hands, I should very much

MINAMI

CROSS

1 appreciate it if you would read it so that I could
2 refresh my memory on this point.

3 Q I have summarized it. I will do so again.

4 The committee shall consist of eight members,
5 four from each country.

6 A Yes, I remember that. That is as you say.

7 Q Yes. and the other part I referred to:
8 Japan's permanent members shall be the Chief of Staff
9 of the Kwantung Army, Chief Councillor in full ser-
10 vice at the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo.

11 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, could
12 he give the witness a copy of it in Japanese if he
13 wants him to explain anything about it? I don't
14 believe the Clerk has it here either.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: If the witness wants a
16 copy in Japanese I will pass to another subject un-
17 till it has been procured.

18 THE WITNESS: Please.

19 MR. COMYNS CARR: All right, I will go on
20 to another subject and go back to this when it is
21 ready.

22 Your Honor, the two exhibits I was referring
23 to about the American protests over the oil agree-
24 ment were No. 939 and No. 965.
25

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1 Q I just wanted to ask you this: You
2 told us that the subjects on which you gave advice,
3 as you call it, to the Manchukuo Government included
4 agriculture, transportation, education, et cetera.
5 Did they not also amongst the et cetera include
6 commercial matters such as this question of an oil
7 monopoly?

8 A I do not know. When I said "et cetera"
9 I meant communications and so forth. Concerning
10 the oil monopoly I have no recollection whatsoever.

11 Q But apart from recollection, did not they
12 in fact include commercial matters generally?

13 A No.

14 Q No?

15 A Yes, no.

16 Q Which do you mean?

17 A I had -- the thought of commercial relations --
18 problems never even entered my head; that is to say,
19 at that time the most important thing was still the
20 stabilization of Manchuria, and I was so busy with
21 that that I had no time to even think of commercial
22 problems -- the stabilization and maintenance of peace.

23 Q With regard to military matters and diplo-
24 matic matters your control was absolute, was it not?
25

A As far as Japan was concerned.

MINAMI

CROSS

1 Q What I mean is, Didn't you on behalf of
2 Japan exercise absolute control over the military
3 and diplomatic affairs of Manchukuo?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Yes, and wasn't it because the position
6 was a little bit vague about commercial matters
7 that this agreement -- new agreement of July, 1935
8 was negotiated by you?

9 A It may have been so. I do not remember
10 well. I would like to say a few words in regard to
11 the state of affairs at that time. I was extremely
12 afraid of Japanese -- influential leaders in Japanese
13 financial circles entering Manchuria before peace
14 and order had been completely restored. Therefore,
15 I tried to put a brake on this. Because of this I
16 was hated and disliked by commercial and financial
17 leaders in Japan and also my stubbornness was made
18 an object of laughter. Therefore, I was very vague
19 on commercial matters and the first thought in my
20 mind at the time was the establishment of peace and
21 order and then the development of a healthy state.

22 MR. COMYNS CARR: Has 850 now arrived?
23 May the witness have the original Japanese?

24 (Whereupon, a document was handed to
25 the witness.)

1 THE MONITOR: May we have a copy too, please,
2 Mr. Comyns Carr, the Language Section?

3 MR. COMYNS CARR: I hope so if there is
4 a spare one.

5 Q General MINAMI, the document you have is
6 the minutes of the Privy Council meeting of the
7 3rd of July, 1935, at which the agreement was ap-
8 proved and you will see the agreement itself set out
9 in the middle -- not very far down in the document.
10 Have you found the agreement itself?

11 THE INTERPRETER: Prior to that the witness
12 said "Will you repeat the question, please?"

13 Q Have you found the text of the agreement
14 which is set out in the minutes?

15 A I have found the agreement, but I cannot
16 find the names as yet.

17 Q What do you mean by the names?

18 A The names of the Committee members.

19 Q I am not asking you. The names are not
20 set out, but you will find a list of the offices
21 of them in the agreement under the heading "III.
22 Understood Matters." Have you found it?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Well, now, read it to yourself, and if I
25 put anything to which you don't agree with, tell us.

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1 A I have understood. In regard to your
2 previous question, one of the representatives of
3 the Manchurian Government is the Chief of the
4 General Affairs Board. He is a Manchurian official,
5 but he is a Japanese.

6 Q Yes, and is one of the representatives
7 of Japan Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army?

8 A Yes.

9 Q Now, if you will look a little further on,
10 you will see that the accused HIROTA as Foreign
11 Minister was asked whether there was any danger
12 of Japan not being able to control this committee
13 as she wished, and this is what he said: "Three
14 out of the four from Manchukuo are ministers and
15 the remaining one is the Chief of General State
16 Affairs who is and will be a Japanese forever, I
17 am confident. Although he is an official of Man-
18 chukuo, he is the central organ assuming the
19 leadership of that country."

20 A As you say.

21 Q I think you said a little while ago that
22 your object was to establish a free and equal
23 partnership between Japan and Manchukuo?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Is that your idea of a free and equal

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partnership?

1
2 A Yes, it is, because although the Director
3 of the General Affairs Board is a Japanese, he
4 is an official of the Manchurian Government.
5 Therefore, I did not think of their race -- sending
6 representatives of Japanese or of Manchurians or
7 of Chinese, but I simply thought that the
8 governments of the two countries, Manchukuo and
9 Japan, should send four representatives each without
10 regard to their race. The Director of the General
11 Affairs Board receives no treatment as a Japanese
12 official. He obeys the laws of Manchukuo as an
13 official of the Manchukuo Government and represents
14 Manchukuo.
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1 Q Do you disagree with HIROTA when he said,
2 "He is an official of Manchukuo and simultaneously
3 a leading instrument dispatched by Japan"?

4 A I believe that was a cause of anxiety for
5 my colleague HIROTA, on the part of my colleague
6 HIROTA.

7 Q Well, now, was Lieutenant General NISHIO
8 your chief of staff?

9 A Yes.

10 Q On the 25th of October, 1935, did you author-
11 ize him to send to the Vice-Minister of War exhibit
12 240 being the Plan for Controlling Organs directing
13 Public Opinion in Manchuria?

14 A Yes, I did give him authority to do that.

15 Q Well, if it was to be a free and independent
16 country what was it necessary for the Japanese Govern-
17 ment to control organs directing public opinion?

18 A In connection with the healthy development
19 of Manchukuo at the time the situation in the publish-
20 ing world was extremely complicated with newspapers
21 and journals owned by Japanese, Chinese -- especially
22 by members of the Chinese race. I felt that such a
23 situation, while it might have some advantages in
24 the healthy development of Manchukuo there also were
25 many disadvantages, and in my judgment the disadvantages

MINAMI

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1 outweighed the advantages. Therefore, since the
2 State of Manchukuo had just been born, I felt that
3 the direction of public opinion was necessary.

4 Q Was the principal disadvantage that somebody
5 might publish an article unfavorable to Japan?

6 A No. The competition in the publishing
7 world was extremely intense.

8 Q Well, now I want to ask you about the Kyowakai
9 or Concordia Society. Are you a member of that?

10 A No.

11 Q Did you hold any office in it?

12 A No.

13 Q Were you adviser to it?

14 A Somebody testified some while ago that I
15 was an honorary adviser but I believe that was a
16 mistake. I was bitterly opposed to the Concordia
17 Society and as soon as I assumed my post as Commander
18 of the Kwantung Army the Concordia Society, which had
19 grown by leaps and bounds up to then, suddenly had
20 to stop its activities. May I state my opinions
21 on this point? I believe it would be of large relevance.

22 The reason for my opposition to the Concordia
23 Society was that if such an association was established
24 while the country was still very young and before
25 local administrations had been firmly established,

1 various functions of the party would conflict with
2 government policies while some might even be considered
3 government spies. Therefore, I believe that among
4 the natives at large there were some who regarded
5 its members as spies. That is to say this system
6 would inaugurate a system of one party -- one country,
7 one party. Therefore, I was opposed to the Concordia
8 Association.

9 Q I am now going to ask you about exhibit 731A
10 which is a book issued by the society in celebration
11 of its ten year jubilee. Is it true as there stated
12 that the society was founded by ITAGAKI in April,
13 1932?

14 A I do not know.

15 Q Is it true that, as there stated, that at
16 the time when you arrived to command the Kwantung
17 Army certain circles were of the opinion that the
18 Kyowakai was by nature a temporary organization?

19 A As I have stated before, I was opposed to the
20 Concordia Society from the first so none of these
21 things have remained in my head very clearly. Actually
22 the members of the Concordia Association were in dire
23 straits.

24 Q Is it true, as stated in the book, that in
25 order to dispel this wrong opinion you, General

1 NISHIO and a number of other representatives of
2 higher authorities issued special directives concern-
3 ing the intrinsic nature of the Kyowakai?

4 A I cannot understand your question. I do
5 not know what is meant by a declaration.

6 Q I did not use the word "declaration." Did
7 you, amongst others, while you were commander in chief,
8 issue special directives about the Kyowakai?

9 A No, as far as I can remember I did not.

10 Q And is it true that the object of those
11 was to show that the Kyowakai was to go on and
12 flourish?

13 A That is completely contrary to the facts.
14 As I have said, I was opposed to the Concordia Society.
15 Therefore, at least during my tenure of office, it was
16 not active.

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1 Q I see. I am pointing out to you, General
2 MINAMI, that in 1941 or '42 the directors of the
3 Society issued a book in which they said the exact
4 opposite and I am asking you whether they aren't
5 right?

6 A What I have said just now is true. It is
7 the truth as far as it concerns myself, so I believe
8 that what they said was a mistake.

9 Q Well now, I will come to a question of
10 relations with China during your tenure of office
11 as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung army. In
12 your affidavit at the bottom of page 12 you say
13 that "In January 1935 Foreign Minister HIROTA declared
14 in the Diet the policy of amity towards China, and
15 on February 3rd replies thereto came from General
16 Chiang Kai-shek" and others, "thus bringing about
17 mutual understanding between China and Japan"; and you
18 go on: "This was followed by the satisfactory
19 conclusion of various agreements between Manchukuo
20 and China relating to customs." Now, I have to suggest
21 to you that all that is untrue. There were not
22 agreements between Manchukuo and China relating to
23 customs on postal and telegraphic matters.
24

25 A Is that a question?

Q Yes, I am putting that to you and asking you

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1 whether you wish to revise your answer -- your
2 statement?

3 A No, I do not change -- I do not change my
4 opinion. It is as it is written in my affidavit.

5 Q Is it not a fact that there were agreements
6 between the Kwantung army and local Chinese
7 authorities on these subjects and not between
8 either Manchukuo or China?

9 A My thought that Manchukuo and China had
10 concluded these agreements.

11 Q Are you prepared to accept it that you are
12 mistaken?

13 A I believe that my affidavit is true and
14 correct and I continue to believe in it.

15 Q And is it not a fact that these agreements
16 were brought about by pressure from the Kwantung
17 army?

18 A I do not believe so.

19 Q And were they not made in 1934, before the
20 statement of HIROTA which you say led to this amity?

21 THE MONITOR: The question to the prosecutor
22 from the witness, sir: "What was the year?"

23 MR. COMYN'S CARR: Is the witness asking
24 what was the year?

25 THE MONITOR: Yes.

1 Q (Continuing) I am suggesting to you that
2 all these agreements were made in 1934, before the
3 statement of HIROTA which you say was the cause of
4 them.

5 A 1934 is before I assumed my post in Man-
6 churia; therefore, I know nothing about it.

7 Q Yes; but you do know that it isn't true
8 that they were made in 1935 as you have said, don't
9 you?

10 A I do not remember this point well, but that
11 is how I understood it.

12 Q Now, at the bottom of page 13 of your
13 affidavit you say that you frequently gave stern
14 instructions to the Kwantung army not to meddle in
15 politics or do anything injurious to the prestige of
16 Manchukuo.

17 A Yes.

18 Q Why was it necessary to do that? Did they
19 frequently disobey your instructions?

20 A These instructions, I believe, were given
21 to the army on the occasion of the outbreak of some
22 kind of incident, but I am not -- I do not at present
23 recall what that particular incident was.

24 Q But why was it necessary to give them
25 frequently?

1 A I gave them instructions whenever such
2 things happened.

3 Q That is to say, if you ever gave such in-
4 structions they did disobey them; did they not?

5 A On the whole, of course, they did obey
6 my instructions, but since it was a large group
7 of people there was some who did not, and every time
8 any such incident occurred I would repeat the
9 instructions. That is what I meant -- any time I
10 heard of any such incident.

11 Q Do you, as a General Commanding, when your
12 orders have been disobeyed simply repeat the orders
13 or do you punish the person who is disobedient?

14 A Sometimes I would punish them, sometimes
15 I would repeat the instructions.

16 Q Now, you go on to say that you abolished
17 the Special Service Department of the army. Why
18 did you do that?

19 A Already the formal independent state of
20 Manchukuo had been established. If the Special
21 Service Organ were to be continued I feared that
22 the Manchurian Government or the Manchurian people
23 might think that, with the army as a background,
24 we were trying to take some steps exceeding our
25 proper authority, and it is for this reason that I

1 abolished the Special Service Department. The
2 greatest reason for the abolishing of the Special
3 Service Department was that I wished to put the
4 Manchurian Government in a position whereby it would
5 be free to conduct its own internal affairs.

6 Q Who was at the head of the Special Service
7 Department; was it DOHIHARA?

8 A DOHIHARA was attached to the staff of the
9 Kwantung army.

10 Q Was he controlling the Special Service
11 Department before you abolished it?

12 A DOHIHARA as a Special Service agent was
13 engaged in intelligence activities.

14 Q Was he also engaged in controlling the ac-
15 tivities of the Special Service Department with
16 regard to the opium traffic?

17 A No. DOHIHARA had nothing to do whatever
18 with problems such as opium.
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1 Q Had the Special Service Department anything
2 to do with them?

3 A I do not know.

4 Q Wasn't the real object of abolishing the
5 Special Service Department that you found that
6 they were running the opium traffic for their per-
7 sonal benefit instead of for the benefit of the
8 Government of Manchukuo, and you wanted the latter
9 to have the profits?

10 A That may have been one of the reasons;
11 but, as I said before, my principal reason was to
12 enable the Manchurian Government to be free to con-
13 duct its own administration -- the administration
14 of its own affairs.

15 Q When the Manchurian Government took over
16 the opium traffic, was that not one of its principal
17 sources of revenue?

18 A I believe that was so.

19 Q Now, at the top of page 14 of your affidavit
20 you say, "During my tenure of office there was never
21 a case of Japanese troops crossing the border."

22 A That is so.

23 Q In your interrogation, exhibit 2207, page
24 3, in the middle, you said this:

25 "Q Your army occupied practically all of

1 Manchukuo, did it not?

2 "A Yes.

3 "Q And some of your troops went beyond
4 the Great Wall.

5 "A Yes."

6 Which of those statements is true?

7 A They are both true.

8 Q Wasn't the Great Wall the border?

9 A Yes.

10 Q And, if they went beyond the Great Wall,
11 they crossed the border, did they not?

12 A The explanation of this is as follows:
13 They often -- once in a while the bandits would
14 cross the Great Wall and create disturbances among
15 the inhabitants of Jehol. On these occasions a
16 portion of the army might have crossed the Great
17 Wall in order to mop up these bandits. My deter-
18 mination not to let the Kwantung Army cross the
19 Great Wall was a very firm one. I gave repeated in-
20 structions to my troops on this point, and I actually
21 carried it out in effect also.

22 If you will give me just ten minutes, I
23 will be able to explain conditions at the time.

24 May I?

25 Q I cannot stop you.

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1 A If troops from Manchuria -- from the
2 north side of the Great Wall should cross into
3 North China, that would be a violation of the
4 border. Concerning this, I have two basic reasons.

5 I may have talked of this on Friday, or
6 it may have been yesterday; but, when the com-
7 mander of the Japanese Army in Korea ordered his army
8 to cross the border into Manchuria on his own, arbi-
9 trary decision, I felt that that was entirely wrong.
10 At the time, General HAYASHI was severely reprimanded
11 by the Emperor which was a matter for great
12 awe for all of us, so that I felt from that time
13 that the authority to cross any particular border
14 emanates only from the Emperor and should not be
15 indulged in lightly.
16

17 My second reason was that, in the Man-
18 churian Incident, I had a very unfortunate experi-
19 ence. This unfortunate experience taught me how
20 difficult it was to maintain an understanding be-
21 tween central army authorities and army authorities
22 on the spot. Therefore, upon my assumption of the
23 post of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, I
24 took a very careful attitude and always took care
25 to determine the attitude of the government toward
any given step. Therefore, I attended cabinet

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1 meetings -- full dress cabinet meetings at which
2 Premier OKADA and all the cabinet members were
3 present and carefully ascertained the policies of
4 the government.

5 The government's policy was to support the
6 independence of Manchukuo and to assist its healthy
7 development. Therefore, my greatest policy as
8 Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, and also
9 as Ambassador to Manchukuo, was the maintenance of
10 peace and order in Manchuria. There are two ways
11 in which peace and order can be maintained in Man-
12 churia: Never to start any troubles -- any fric-
13 tion between the Soviet Union on the northern bord-
14 ers, and, to the south, never to start an incident
15 with China. Therefore, the despatching of troops
16 outside the border was strictly prohibited --
17 troops of the Kwantung Army outside the border was
18 strictly prohibited.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Is this counsel of per-
20 fection required? The question is what he did.

21 THE WITNESS: Is that question directed
22 to me, sir?

23 THE PRESIDENT: To the learned counsel
24 cross-examining you.

25 MR. COMYNS CARR: Well, your Honor, I did

MINAMI

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2 Premier OKADA and all the cabinet members were
3 present and carefully ascertained the policies of
4 the government.

5 The government's policy was to support the
6 independence of Manchukuo and to assist its healthy
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9 as Ambassador to Manchukuo, was the maintenance of
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20 THE PRESIDENT: Is this council of per-
21 fection required? The question is what he did.

22 THE WITNESS: Is that question directed
23 to me, sir?

24 THE PRESIDENT: To the learned counsel
25 cross-examining you.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Well, your Honor, I did

1 not want it to be thought that I was stopping him
2 from saying anything he wanted to say.

3 THE PRESIDENT: We know what we need. We
4 want to be given the facts.

5 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

6 Q What we want to know, as the President has
7 told you, is why did your troops cross the Great
8 Wall?

9 A Only a portion of that army crossed the
10 border in order to mop up the bandits.

11 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
12 minutes.

13 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
14 taken until 1500, after which the proceed-
15 ings were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military
2 Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

4 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing):

5 Q General MINAMI, in the middle of page 14
6 of your affidavit you say: "During the same month--"
7 that was June 1935 "in order to assure peace along
8 the China-Manchoukuo border, the so-called 'UMEZU-HO
9 Yin-chin, 'JOIARA-CHENG Te-chun' and other agreements
10 were concluded. With regard to these agreements I re-
11 ceived reports that they were concluded in an exceed-
12 ingly friendly atmosphere.'

13 As a matter of fact was the HO-UMEZU agree-
14 ment concluded as the result of an ultimatum with a
15 fixed date?

16 A That is something that belongs to the juris-
17 diction of the China Expeditionary Forces and is out-
18 side my own jurisdiction, so that I do not know how
19 things went. However, it was not a matter in which
20 the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army could
21 interfere.

22 Q Was not the threat in the ultimatum that if
23 Japan's demands were not accepted immediately as a
24 whole you would invade China with the Kwantung Army?

25 A As I have just stated I know nothing about

1 what kind of negotiations were conducted as this was
2 entirely outside my own jurisdiction. However, I
3 can say definitely that concerning the last point
4 in your question that the Kwantung Army would invade
5 China, there is not an iota of truth in that -- that
6 the Kwantung Army with its entire strength would invade
7 China.

8 Q Do you mean that only part of it was going
9 to invade China?

10 A No.

11 Q Were not the other Japanese forces in China
12 placed under your command for the purpose of this
13 threatened invasion?

14 A That is a complete misstatement.

15 Q If what I have suggested is true, you would
16 hardly call that concluding an agreement in an exceed-
17 ingly friendly atmosphere, would you?

18 A I received a report that it was concluded in an
19 extremely friendly atmosphere.

20 Q From whom did you get that report?

21 A DOHIHARA sent word that the negotiations at
22 Peking were proceeding extremely successfully -- a very
23 friendly atmosphere.

24 Q DOHIHARA told you that, did you say?

25 A DOHIHARA went to Peking and told me of the

1 talk he had there with Cheng Te-chun. The North China
2 garrison forces were under the direct control of the
3 Emperor. I, also, was under the direct control of the
4 Emperor. The jurisdiction of our two armies was entirely
5 separate. Without a special order from the Emperor
6 the two armies could not conduct a common conspiracy.

7 Q Is it true that the agreement was the result
8 of a demand with an ultimatum and a time limit?

9 A As I have been saying for the past few min-
10 utes, I received no reports whatsoever from details
11 such as those. It was outside my jurisdiction.

12 Q Did you ever see the alleged agreement itself?

13 A No.

14 Q Do you know if there ever was a written agree-
15 ment?

16 A No.

17 Q Now, I shall have, in view of your answers,
18 to refer to prosecution exhibit 2206, which is a collec-
19 tion of newspaper reports gathered by the Japanese
20 Foreign Office for the information of itself and
21 copies sent to the Chinese Embassy -- to the Japanese
22 Embassy in China.
23

24 Is it true that the Japanese Foreign Office
25 stated on the 31st of May that if the demands made
upon the Chinese authorities in North China were not

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1 accepted, Japan would probably occupy the demilitarized
2 zone?

3 A I do not know.

4 Q You were Ambassador to Manchukuo?

5 A Yes.

6 Q And the demilitarized zone was the territory
7 just on the other side of your boundary, wasn't it?

8 A Yes, that is so.
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1 Q And do you mean to say that you were not
2 kept informed of a matter like that?

3 A I had a secretary at the embassy who was very
4 influential and who was well versed in English. This
5 secretary is a relative of the present Premier. He
6 would always translate English reports and hand them to
7 me. I often saw reports by foreign correspondents
8 stationed in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinking,
9 Mukden and Dairen. Therefore, I was unable to place
10 any confidence whatsoever in these reports, because
11 they were all suppositions. As I have stated beforehand,
12 my firm conviction was that no Japanese troops should be
13 permitted to cross the border. Therefore, I believe
14 that all these reports were groundless rumors and
15 suppositions based on facts. I felt at the time that
16 later events would prove that these correspondents were
17 mistaken when they would take up any small, insignificant
18 incident and say that there was grave possibility that
19 that incident would develop into a second Manchurian
20 Incident. That is all.

21 Q Did the Japanese Army make a series of demands
22 upon China, beginning with the removal of General
23 Yu Hsueh-Chung, the Governor of Hopei Province?

24 A The Kwantung Army never made any such demands.

25 Q Do you know whether the North China Army made

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1 such demands?

2 A I heard of rumors, but I know nothing of what
3 actually took place.

4 Q That was under the command, was it not, of
5 your fellow accused, UMEZU?

6 A At one time it was under UMEZU's command. At
7 another time it was under the command of his successor,
8 General TADA.

9 Q On the first of June, 1935, was it under
10 UMEZU's command?

11 A I believe it was under UMEZU's command in June.

12 Q On or about that day, was General HAYASHI
13 the Minister of War in Mukden -- I mean, in Hsinking?

14 A Yes.

15 Q And did General UMEZU come there, too, on
16 the same day?

17 A UMEZU came after the 29th of May on the
18 invitation of the Minister of War.

19 Q And did the three of you hold a conference?

20 A No.

21 Q Were you not all three together there at the
22 same time?

23 A Yes.

24 Q And weren't you there for the express purpose
25 of discussing these demands that were to be made upon

1 the Chinese and what should be done if they were not
2 complied with?

3 A No, that is a question that completely misses
4 the mark. UMEZU came to Hsinking on May 29 on the
5 invitation of the War Minister, and there he had a talk
6 with the War Minister in which he reported on con-
7 ditions in the area under his command; that is to say,
8 North China. And I wasn't there, myself.

9 After this conference was over, all he did
10 was to come to me to say his greetings. What he told
11 me there was that he had come to Hsinking on receiving
12 a telegram from the War Minister, that he had reported
13 to the War Minister on routine business matters, and
14 that he was returning to Peking.

15 I said, "You are leaving awfully early. Why
16 don't you stay at least for dinner?" But he returned
17 the same day -- returned immediately, saying that he
18 would go home.

19 Q In the first week of June, was all home leave
20 of the Japanese Army stopped?

21 A This also does not come under my jurisdiction.

22 Q Do you know that it happened?

23 A It is not under my jurisdiction.

24 Q Now answer the question.

25 A I am answering the question.

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1 Q Do you know that it happened?

2 A No.

3 Q On or about the 6th of June, was there a
4 Japanese brigade stationed in the demilitarized zone
5 northeast of Peking?

6 A I do not know. It is something that concerns
7 foreign countries.

8 Q What do you mean, "foreign countries"?

9 A Foreign countries from the point of view of
10 Manchuria.

11 Q It is just outside what you say was your
12 border, wasn't it?

13 A Yes.

14 Q And on or about the 6th of June, did General
15 HAYASHI inform you that if the Chinese didn't accept
16 the ultimatum all the forces, both of the North China
17 Army as well as your own, would be placed under your
18 command?

19 A No.

20 Q On or about the 8th of June was June 11 fixed
21 as the day by which the terms had got to be complied
22 with?

23 A The reason for HAYASHI's -- you completely
24 misunderstand the reason for HAYASHI's arrival, coming
25 to Manchuria. He came to Manchuria in order to inspect

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1 conditions in Manchukuo, and he did not touch the
2 subject you mentioned in his talks with me at all.
3 As I said, and as you have said, there were all kinds
4 of communications. There were also rumors such as
5 the one which you have just questioned me on. But
6 they are all groundless rumors based on mistaken
7 suppositions, and are unworthy of notice.

8 Q Did you know Major General ISOGAI, Rensuke?

9 A I do.
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1 Q Was he at this date the military attache to
2 the Japanese embassy in China?

3 A I do not know. I think he was in Shanghai
4 at the time.

5 Q Did he say on the 7th of June we, that is the
6 Japanese, seek a solution of all Sino-Jap problems
7 including that of the puppet regime? By the latter
8 phrase I mean Chinese recognition of the new empire.

9 A I did not hear anything about that. There
10 may have been newspaper reports on this; that is to
11 say, newspapers dealing in rumors.

12 Q On the same day did General UMEZU make a
13 public statement at the conclusion of discussions with
14 the Chinese that future Japanese action depends upon
15 the sincerity of the Chinese in dealing with the Japan-
16 ese requests?

17 A I received no report concerning this supposed
18 speech.

19 Q Was Colonel SAKAI the chief of staff of the
20 Japanese garrison at Tientsin?

21 THE MONITOR: Mr. Comyns Carr, is this
22 Lieutenant Colonel or full Colonel?

23 MR. COMYNS CARR: I have only got it "Colonel."

24 A I believe it was Colonel SAKAI that was chief
25 of staff at that garrison.

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1 Q Did he state on Sunday, the 9th of June,
2 that the ultimatum would be delivered on the next day
3 and must be answered by Tuesday?

4 A No, I did not hear of any such thing.

5 Q And on the Monday, the 10th of June, did the
6 Chinese give in and agree to all the demands?

7 A I do not know a single thing about small
8 details such as that; however, I only received a
9 report that the Ho Yin-chin agreement had been con-
10 cluded -- the UMEZU-Ho Yin-chin agreement.

11 Q Tell me, do you regard an ultimatum with a
12 time limit with a threat of invasion as a small detail?

13 A Yes, I think it is too silly.

14 Q You do?

15 A Yes.

16 Q In consequence of the agreement did the
17 Chinese evacuate North China of its troops?

18 A I did hear that they did all evacuate; however,
19 how and in what manner they evacuated is something out-
20 side my jurisdiction and I know nothing about it.

21 Q Were you seeing the Japanese newspapers when
22 you were in Manchuria?

23 A Sometimes I did; sometimes I didn't. On the
24 whole I think I more or less passed my eyes through it.

25 Q Did you notice they claimed that this was a

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1 complete capitulation to Japan's requirements in
2 North China?

3 A No, I did not notice that. These reports
4 were all entirely different to our own ideas so I
5 didn't even bother to let them remain in my head.

6 Q The demands made upon China were pretty
7 drastic, weren't they?

8 A Demands made by whom?

9 Q By Japan.

10 A By whom of Japan?

11 THE MONITOR: Mr. Comyns Carr, the witness
12 replied: "By whom of Japan?"

13 MR. COMYNS CARR: By the Japanese Foreign
14 Office and the Japanese Army in North China.

15 A I know nothing of the details of this.

16 Q Would you expect a foreign country to demand
17 that you should remove the governor of a province and
18 the mayor of one of your principal cities and that you
19 should abolish one of your government organizations and
20 move your troops out of part of your own territory?
21 Can you imagine any country acceding to such demands
22 except under extreme pressure?

23 A Since I am being asked about all sorts of
24 things which I myself never did or had anything to do
25 with there is no way in which I can give you a reply.

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1 Q But you have taken it upon yourself to say
2 that all this was done in an exceedingly friendly
3 atmosphere?

4 A That is why I said I received a report to
5 that effect.

6 Q Did you believe it?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Now, on the top of page 15 of your affidavit
9 you refer to Prince Teh of Inner Mongolia, on the 2d
10 of June 1935 or shortly before that date. Do you know
11 that a Japanese airplane landed at Panchiang in his
12 territory?

13 THE MONITOR: Mr. Comyns Carr, will you kindly
14 spell out that place, please?

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: The name of the place?

16 THE MONITOR: Yes, sir.

17 MR. COMYNS CARR: P-a-n-c-h-i-a-n-g.

18 A I do not remember the exact date but I do
19 remember that one or two members of the staff of the
20 Kwantung Army went there for liaison purposes.

21 Q Yes, did you send them?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Did they when they got there demand that you
24 should be allowed to build an airdrome at that place?

25 A I did not give any such orders.

Q And establish a branch of the Special Service

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Department there?

1 A I did say when I sent these officers that it
2 would be a good thing to establish a liaison agency
3 there.

4 Q Did you also instruct them to demand that he
5 should move his capital 100 miles away?

6 A No.

7 Q Who were these officers?

8 A As far as I remember there was a section chief
9 by the name of Lieutenant Colonel IS' IMOTO, Torazo.
10 It may have been TANAKA, Ryukichi; I have no clear
11 recollection of that point. My purpose in sending
12 them was simply to observe conditions on the spot there.

13 Q Didn't you tell me just now that you had told
14 them to suggest that they should build an airdrome there?

15 A No, I didn't.

16 Q Now, in November 1935 you say this, the bottom
17 of page 15 of your affidavit: "I heard that the forma-
18 tion of the Hsui-Chahar regime toward the end of the
19 same year was at the initiative of the Chinese govern-
20 ment." Who told you that one?

21 A I believe it was in a report from DOHIHARA.

22 Q Did you send DOHIHARA to North China to
23 establish this regime?
24

25 A I did not give DOHIHARA such a difficult mission.

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1 Q What was his mission as you gave it to him?

2 A DOHIHARA was an expert on China, could speak
3 the Chinese language and was a man of very mild char-
4 acter. Therefore I sent him to Peking to talk with
5 General Sung Che-yuan and to see whether some means
6 for peaceful relations between Japan and China could
7 not be found. He also -- DOHIHARA also had many
8 friends among the Chinese. At the time various
9 rumors were circulated to the effect that I had some
10 underground plan in mind but I wish to firmly state
11 here that there is no truth in such rumors.

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1 Q Do you know that DOHIHARA showed his friendli-
2 ness to the Chinese by announcing on the 18th of Novem-
3 ber, 1935, that if an autonomy for the North was not
4 proclaimed five Japanese divisions were going into
5 Hopei and six into Shangtung?

6 A I have heard of this for the first time today
7 from the prosecutor. Not only was it completely false,
8 but such a thing would be completely contrary to my
9 mission, would be completely contrary to DOHIHARA's
10 mission.

11 Q Did you know that he fixed noon on November 21
12 as the time limit for acceptance of these terms?

13 A No.

14 Q Did you send troops on or about the 20th of
15 November to Shan-Hai-Kwan on the Great Wall to back
16 him up?

17 A That is utterly groundless.

18 Q And under those threats did the Chinese give
19 way and was the autonomous council established for
20 North China? I should have said for Eastern Hopei
21 and Hopei-Chahar.

22 A No, no such thing happened.

23 Q It was established, wasn't it?

24 A We had nothing to do with it. The East
25 Hopei regime was set up by the Chinese themselves

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1 and I had nothing to do with it whatsoever, and we
2 had nothing to do with it whatsoever.

3 Q Now, you told me General NISHIO was
4 your Chief of Staff?

5 A Yes.

6 Q I now want to refer to exhibit 195. On the
7 9th of December, 1935, immediately after the establish-
8 ment of this so-called autonomous regime, did NISHIO
9 issue a document with your authority about the propa-
10 ganda in North China?

11 A I believe he did.

12 Q And did he send it to FURUSHO, the Vice
13 Minister of War in Tokyo?

14 A Yes, I have heard that that is so.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: That is prosecution docu-
16 ment 1242, and I wish to read certain passages to the
17 witness.

18 THE MONITOR: Mr. Comyns Carr, is that going
19 to be very long or just the first paragraph?

20 MR. COMYNS CARR: The first unnumbered one
21 and then the ones numbered 3 and 5 and over the page 7,
22 and then 1 and 2 under heading III.

23 THE MONITOR: Thank you very much, sir.

24 MR. COMYNS CARR (Reading):

25 "Kwantung Army's Propaganda Plan Which Shall

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1 Be Carried Out in Parallel with its Military Activity
2 in North China.

3 "I. General Principle.

4 "We start our propaganda to convince the
5 whole world of our lawfulness, as soon as the advance-
6 ment of the Kwantung Army into China Proper takes place.
7 We shall launch out on a movement to estrange the in-
8 habitants of North China from the central government,
9 by fermenting anti-Kumingtung and anti-communism
10 agitation among them. As for the Chinese people and
11 army of the rest of China, we shall take a measure to
12 form an anti-war atmosphere."

13 And then in Section II, paragraph 3:

14 "It is the greatest desire of the Japanese
15 Government to form an anti-communist front with the
16 North China independent government, for it may be
17 considered the first ray of hope for the establish-
18 ment of the lasting peace in the Orient by the harmonious
19 cooperation among Japan, China, and Manchuria. We,
20 therefore, shall assume a definite attitude to support
21 wholeheartedly the establishment and development of
22 the independent government in North China."

23 Paragraph 5:

24 "It must be made clear that when we do dispatch
25 our military force to China some time in the future, we

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1 do it for the purpose of punishing the Chinese mili-
2 tary clique, and not the Chinese people at large."

3 Paragraph 7:

4 "As for the Chinese forces, we will take a
5 measure to promote antagonism between them and to
6 increase their admiration for the strength of the
7 Japanese military power, thus depriving their fighting
8 spirit."

9 And Section III, "Execution Program.

10 "1. Propaganda shall be planned and carried out
11 by the Army staff. The special service facilities in
12 China and Inner Mongolia and also the expeditionary
13 forces there shall also perform the duty.

14 "2. Prior to the advance of our military
15 forces into China Proper, this propaganda shall be
16 launched, chiefly to support from the side, the
17 propaganda of the Japanese government and the Japanese
18 forces stationed in China. After the advance of our
19 forces into China Proper, it shall be performed so as
20 to facilitate our military activities."

21 That is all I propose to read.

22 Q Now, General MINAMI, having been reminded of
23 the document issued by your Chief of Staff with your
24 authority, do you still say that during all the time
25 you were in command of the Kwantung Army you were

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20,000

1 doing nothing hostile to the Chinese Government?

2 A Yes, I do.

3 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until
4 half-past nine tomorrow morning.

5 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
6 was taken until Wednesday, 16 April 1947, at
7 0930.)

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